The Iraqi government's attitude on the issues of the residents of the two banks of the Shatt al-Arab (1925-1933) (An analytical documentary study based on unpublished royal court documents)

Abstract

The study aims to identify the most significant challenges faced by residents of the Shatt al-Arab, whether in Iraq or Iran, particularly (Al-Muhammarah), the center of the Arab component consisting of (the clans affiliated with the Emirate of Arabistan and the Iraqi nationals), the most important of which is "Naturalization with Iranian nationality", with taking care not to overlook additional issues concerning Iraqi nationals in the country, the most serious of which is the expulsion of individuals working in Iranian oil companies, their cancellation of nationality and passports, the confiscation of their property, and the annulment of their property rights.This was followed by a follow-up on the Iraqi government's attitude on those incidents, emphasizing the constraints and difficulties it faced as a result of Reza Shah's government's lack of recognition, perhaps the significant of these is the exposure of the Iraqi diplomatic corps, as it is considered a haven for Iraqis in Iran, to acts of spy by the government of Reza Shah, with reference to its challenge of all these restrictions diplomatically and the initiation of opening channels of communication in order to address the effects of these measures against the Arab component, particularly the Iraqis.The Iraqi government's attitude was supported by the British government, which was the only line of communication available to the Iraqi government resorted to in light of the insistence of the government of Reza Shah on not recognizing the legitimacy of the Iraqi state. An attempt by him to exploit those circumstances to realize his dreams of building a military dictatorship in the region, especially after he was deceived by his victory over the Emirate of Arabistan. It appears, and with great sadness, that the Iraqi government's and its diplomatic entities' posture in Iran regarding these difficulties was not at crisis level, even if there was a justification for that position. Unpublished documents were used to reach impartial conclusions that were not influenced by interests.