Impacts of the Eisenhower Doctrine on Jordanian-Egyptian Relations (1957–1958)

Abstract

The Jordanian-Egyptian relations between 1957 and 1958 witnessed notable tensions due to the divergent stances of the two countries regarding the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was announced by the United States in 1957 with the aim of containing Soviet influence in the Middle East following the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt. While Egypt rejected the doctrine as an extension of Western hegemony and sought to strengthen its alliance with the Soviet Union, Jordan accepted aid under its framework to secure internal stability, especially after the collapse of the Arab alliance and the decline of Egyptian and Saudi support. This divergence deepened Arab polarization, leading to political accusations and externally backed coup attempts, while the United States offered political and military support to King Hussein. Meanwhile, Egypt reinforced its leadership in the Arab nationalist camp.

The Eisenhower Doctrine also exacerbated tensions between the United States and the Arab states allied with the Soviet Union, especially Egypt, which saw the initiative as an American attempt to impose Western hegemony on the region and undermine national liberation movements. Gamal Abdel Nasser considered the doctrine to be targeting his project of leading the Arab world and confronting colonialism, which prompted him to strengthen his relations with the Soviet Union politically and militarily, including arms deals and support for economic projects such as the High Dam.