alsultat altashrieiat ealaa aeumaal alhukumat fi zili aldustur aleiraqii nafidh nihayiyun 2005

Authors

  • Ali Mashhadi Assistant Professor at Qom State University
  • Sarah Samir Massir PhD student at Pardis Farabi University of Tehran, Iran

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.66026/f3ek7v66

Keywords:

Oversight, parliamentary, government work.

Abstract

Parliamentary oversight is considered a cornerstone of the democratic system, as it enables the legislative authority to monitor the performance of the executive authority to ensure compliance with the constitution and the protection of the public interest. The 2005 Iraqi Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Representatives stipulate several oversight mechanisms, such as submitting questions, conducting interrogations, initiating parliamentary investigations, and raising general topics for debate, up to the possibility of withdrawing confidence from the government. These mechanisms aim to achieve a balance between the legislative and executive branches within the framework of the principle of separation of powers.

The research examines the nature of parliamentary oversight in terms of its concept and conditions, highlighting two key factors for its effectiveness: first, the willingness and ability of members of parliament to exercise oversight within a legal framework that provides access to information and establishes investigative committees; and second, the prevailing political culture, which may either foster participation or hinder it. The study also identifies other influential factors, including the political and security situation, the structure of the political system, the level of citizens’ awareness, the nature of the electoral and party system, as well as social and economic conditions.

The study reviews the performance of the Iraqi Council of Representatives during the two parliamentary terms (2006–2010) and (2010–2014). It concludes that, despite the broad constitutional powers, parliamentary oversight was clearly weak: interrogations were conducted only in limited cases and were driven more by political and promotional motives than by professional considerations, while some officials refused to appear before the council.

The research recommends reducing procedural constraints, such as the requirement to collect 25 signatures to initiate an interrogation, encouraging members of parliament to use oversight tools without fear of political bloc pressure, and strengthening political culture and public awareness. It also calls on political parties—particularly those not participating in government—to exercise oversight objectively and avoid political retaliation, in order to ensure the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight and uphold the principles of transparency and accountability.

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Published

2025-11-17