The impact of electoral systems on determining the style of government in Iraq and Lebanon

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the pivotal role played by electoral systems in determining the system of governance in countries with complex sectarian social structures, such as Iraq and Lebanon. It demonstrates that the adoption of a proportional representation system in both countries was not neutral; rather, it emerged in response to the necessity for consensus among the main sectarian components. In Iraq, this system led to broad partisan pluralism but produced fragmented parliaments and fragile coalition governments. These governments, formed through post-election alliances, fail to achieve political stability. In Lebanon, the electoral system, even in its modern proportional form, has worked to entrench the sectarian character of politics. This is achieved through the engineering of electoral districts and lists, which ensures the reproduction of traditional leadership and hinders the potential for genuine political change.

The study concludes that a fundamental paradox exists in the "consociational democracy" model based on proportional representation. While it achieves a high degree of "representative justice" and ensures broad participation of societal components, it undermines "governance effectiveness" and leads to a weak and unstable executive authority. Consequently, the problem of weak governance lies not in the electoral system itself, but in the sectarian political and social environment within which it operates. This environment transforms the system from a tool for expressing popular will into a mechanism for managing and reproducing societal divisions.