Elements of consociational democracy in Iraq after 2005
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66026/400say66Keywords:
Consociational Democracy, Power-Sharing, Veto Power, Principle of Proportionality, Sectoral Autonomy of Components.Abstract
This study addresses the elements of consociational democracy in Iraq after 2005, which are considered a fundamental basis for placing the political process on the right path toward achieving genuine peacebuilding within Iraq among its various components and political entities. The study aims to explain the process of power-sharing through broad coalitions to ensure the participation of all groups within these coalitions in the political process. It also seeks to clarify the right of veto (veto power) as a mechanism to protect balance among the different components within Iraq, given that it is a country characterized by ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. Furthermore, the study aims to illustrate the principle of proportionality in the distribution of legislative power through the allocation of parliamentary seats according to population ratios via a system of proportional representation, as well as in the executive authority through the distribution of key positions such as the Presidency of the Republic, the Prime Ministership, the Speakership of Parliament, and other ministerial and executive institutions within Iraq. Finally, the study seeks to demonstrate the sectoral autonomy of the different components in Iraq by enabling each group—whether ethnic or religious—to manage its internal affairs in accordance with its specific characteristics independently of other components. The primary objective of this research is to explain and analyze the consensual elements within the Iraqi political system after 2005, in order to determine their effectiveness in achieving stability and building peace in Iraqi society, which is classified as a diverse and divided society. Specifically, the research seeks to identify the constitutional texts and political norms that established the principle of consensus according to Behart's theory, and the extent to which this principle is reflected in representation within executive, legislative, military, and security institutions, in addition to evaluating the impact of this principle on the performance of these institutions.
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