Establishing the Constituent Units of a Federal State and the Accession of New Units: A Comparative Constitutional Study with Reference to the Iraqi Constitution

Abstract

The federal system is based on the distribution of powers between the government and the constituent units, ensuring the independence of each level in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. The judicial system is not limited to the mere existence of federal units within the state, but extends to other highly important constitutional matters, including the necessary establishment of new federal units. Similarly, the inclusion of other units, regions, or territories within the federal state is a sensitive constitutional matter, as it directly impacts the organization of the federal structure and the definition of its territorial and political scope. The establishment of new federal units within the federal state could lead to fundamental changes in the federal balance between the central government and its constituent units. The problem is that the addition of a new unit or region to the federal state may result in a change to the state's geographical borders, a reorganization of its territorial scope, and its relations with other states. To clarify the position of the constitutions of the comparative countries on the issue of the joining of new units or regions to the Iraqi state, through the analysis of constitutional and legal texts, the study indicates that the comparative constitutions in federal countries differ with regard to the organization of the formation of states or the joining of new states. Therefore, the researcher recommends formulating clear and specific provisions to regulate these constitutional procedures.