The Rational Evidence and Its Perception of Good and Evil According to the Imamiyyah

Authors

  • Abdullah Maytham Ali Abdullah Al-Gharabi1* 1 Mustansiriyah University, Mustansiriyah University Presidency, Department of Administrative Affairs, Baghdad, Iraq

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.66026/yfqcf679

Keywords:

Evidence, Intellect, Rational Appraisal (Taḥsīn), Rational Disapproval.

Abstract

This research examines the rational proof (al-dalīl al-'aqlī) within the science of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) according to the Imamiyyah (Twelver Shi'a school), considering it one of the fundamental epistemological foundations in the process of deriving legal rulings, particularly in cases of absent, ambiguous, or contradictory scriptural texts. The research aims to delineate the features of this proof by analyzing its concept, clarifying its limits, and revealing its position among the four legal proofs: the Quran, the Sunnah, consensus (ijmā'), and reason ('aql).

The research addresses the conceptual framework of rational proof by defining "proof" (dalīl) and "reason" ('aql) linguistically and terminologically, then explaining what is meant by rational proof as that which sound reason perceives with certainty and from which a legal ruling can be discovered. The research also examines the divisions of this proof, distinguishing between what reason grasps independently, such as perceiving the goodness of justice and the evil of injustice, and what it cannot grasp without the assistance of religious law, such as the obligation of a prerequisite before a duty. Furthermore, the research touches upon the division of reason into theoretical and practical, determining the scope of each in perception.

The study also investigates the issue of rational judgments of good and evil (al-taḥsīn wa al-taqbīḥ al-'aqliyyān), considering it the epistemological foundation upon which major principles of legal theory rest, such as the principle of correlation between the judgment of reason and the judgment of religious law, and the principle of the evil of punishment without prior notification. It clarifies the positions of scholars on this matter: some hold that these perceptions are objective and established in reality, while others interpret them as commonly accepted propositions based on social convention.

The research concludes by addressing the question of the authority (ḥujjiyyah) of rational proof, highlighting that the point of dispute is confined to certain rational proof that stands alongside the Quran and Sunnah, with agreement on the lack of authority of speculative proof except that which the Lawgiver has considered authoritative, such as the reliable report of a trustworthy narrator. The research concludes that reason, within this framework, serves a disclosing function regarding legal rulings, not a creative one, and that reliance upon it is consistent with the methodological approach of legal theory in regulating the process of legal derivation according to rational and precise methodological foundations, without confusing certain perceptions of reason with personal tastes or rational preferences unsupported by evidence.

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Published

2026-11-08