The Challenge of Attributing Criminal Liability for Crimes Arising from the Use of Artificial Intelligence: A Comparative Analytical Study

Abstract

This research aims to examine the challenge of attributing criminal liability for crimes arising from the use of artificial intelligence—a comparative analytical study conducted in light of the rapid evolution of intelligent systems and their expanding scope of application across various fields. It addresses the accompanying legal difficulties in identifying the party responsible for criminal acts and consequences that may stem from the operation of these systems. The research problem centers on the adequacy of traditional criminal law rules in determining liability when the roles of the programmer, developer, manufacturer, operator, and user overlap, or when the system produces behavior that was not directly anticipated at the time of its operation. The study employs a comparative analytical methodology, examining the general rules of criminal liability under the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 (as amended) and comparing them with modern legislative trends—specifically the European regulation on artificial intelligence and certain British legislative approaches. The research concludes that artificial intelligence cannot independently bear criminal liability under prevailing criminal law principles; rather, liability must be linked to an act or omission attributable to a person, the presence of intent or fault, and a causal link. Furthermore, the study identifies a need for clearer Iraqi legislation that defines the liability of the various parties involved and regulates technical evidence and unforeseen outcomes, all while upholding the principles of legality and the personal nature of criminal liability.