Choice by Caprice: Its Forms and the Opinions of Jurists

Abstract

            Upon examining the literature of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and its principles (uṣūl al-fiqh), it becomes evident that many scholarly discussions extend beyond the boundaries of the revealed texts to address the manner in which a legally accountable person (mukallaf) engages with them. Is this engagement founded upon sincerity, submission, and compliance with the rulings of Islamic law, or is it driven by selective adherence based on personal desires and inclinations? Within this context emerges the concept of **preference based on personal desire (al-ikhtiyār bi al-tashahhī)**, an issue that may appear simple on the surface, such as adopting legal concessions (rukhaṣ), yet in reality reflects a profound ethical and religious commitment. A person who selects legal opinions merely because they accord with personal interests does not simply express a natural inclination toward ease; rather, such conduct raises a fundamental question concerning the true meaning of servitude to God. Is the objective to follow the strongest legal evidence and submit faithfully to divine guidance, or merely to seek legal justifications for predetermined desires? Consequently, this issue is not merely a matter of legal opinion or juristic disagreement, but a precise criterion for distinguishing genuine religiosity, founded upon sincere submission to God, from superficial religiosity that is limited to outward observance while neglecting the higher objectives and spirit of Islamic law.