The presumption of error between the requirements of effectiveness and the demands of criminal justice

Authors

  • Mohammad Ali Haji Dehabadi Iran / Qom University / Department of Law Qom University
  • Hussein Hatem Shoun Al-Shahmani PhD candidate in Criminal Law, Qom State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.66026/ppdh6213

Keywords:

Penal philosophy, fundamental legal principle, judicial system, governing principle.

Abstract

The concept of the "presumption of criminal fault" represents an exceptional shift in contemporary penal thought, encroaching upon the established fundamental rule that positions innocence as the governing principle of procedural justice. This juncture embodies a point of philosophical conflict between two orientations: the first advocates the preservation of individual liberty by surrounding the accused with a shield of strict procedural guarantees, while the second aspires to achieve the public interest and avert escalating risks in modern societies.

This presumption is distinguished by its direct impact on traditional rules of evidence; it shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused, moving beyond the doctrine of punishment tied to direct material harm toward a rationale of "preemptive protection" against crimes of danger and complex regulatory activities—such as environmental violations, financial infractions, and public safety regulations.

However, the legitimacy of this distinct nature remains inseparable from its practical efficacy within the judicial system. The utilitarian dimension of this presumption lies in expediting the administration of justice and overcoming the prosecution's difficulty in proving mens rea or intent within intricate activities, thereby reinforcing both general and specific deterrence.

Nevertheless, the moral standing of this efficacy holds true only insofar as the presumption remains a flexible standard that is "rebuttable." This ensures that the accused is granted the opportunity to refute the attribution of fault or establish force majeure and external cause, thereby safeguarding justice from lapsing into the trap of "blind strict liability" that deviates from the principle of personal responsibility grounded in intent and volition.

In conclusion, it becomes evident that the presumption of fault is not merely a procedural expedient for simplification, but rather a delicate balancing mechanism requiring explicit statutory authority and strict judicial interpretation, thereby shielding society from the risk of sacrificing fundamental human rights and liberties for the sake of mere procedural efficiency.

References

Downloads

Published

2026-11-08