Logical Probability and Inductive Inference in the Thought of Richard Swinburne and Their Significance for Contemporary Philosophical Knowledge

Abstract

This research aims to study and analyze the logical and epistemological foundations upon which the concept of logical probability and the theory of inductive inference were established by the British philosopher Richard Swinburne, highlighting the impact of this vision on the development of contemporary epistemology. The research begins by addressing the fundamental problem raised by David Hume concerning the nature of induction and its rationality, where Hume demonstrated that the transition from partial observations to universal and future judgments lacks a rigorous deductive foundation, and cannot be empirically justified without falling into logical circularity. The research then examines the efforts made by Swinburne to reconstruct probabilistic rationality through a critique of previous solutions — such as logical positivism and Karl Popper’s approach — and by drawing a precise and decisive distinction between statistical probability, which relates to the frequencies of the physical world, and logical probability, which measures the support relation between evidence and hypotheses as an objective logical relation. The research also clarifies how Swinburne moved beyond traditional enumerative induction toward the model of explanatory inference, and how he established precise criteria for the theory of confirmation that enable a logical transition from limited evidence to general explanatory hypotheses. In conclusion, the research finds that Swinburne’s model represents a significant philosophical contribution to overcoming Humean skepticism, and that he has presented an integrated conception of probabilistic rationality capable of interpreting scientific practice and the logic employed in constructing human knowledge in a rigorous and coherent manner.