Aspects of Financial Legislative Delegation in the Iraqi Constitutional System and Parliamentary Safeguards to Limit It:A Comparative Study with the Egyptian Constitution

Abstract

This study examines the phenomenon of "financial legislative delegation" as an exceptional mechanism driven by contemporary economic crises and mandated by administrative flexibility requirements, balancing fiscal efficiency with constitutional legitimacy. The research problem addresses the structural gap arising from the silence of the 2005 Constitution of the Republic of Iraq regarding this tool. In practice, this silence has led to the emergence of "covert delegation" and expansive financial authorizations granted to the government through consecutive budget laws and the Federal Financial Management Law. This contrasts sharply with the strictly codified approach adopted by the 2014 Egyptian Constitution, which enforces rigorous controls over decrees with the force of law.

The study reaches several key conclusions, most notably that Iraq's constitutional silence did not impede the emergence of a recurring pattern of actual covert delegation—particularly regarding fund transfers, public borrowing, and fee adjustments—thereby representing a practical departure from the separation of powers and an infringement on parliament's exclusive financial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the study demonstrates the efficacy of constitutional judicial review in both nations through landmark rulings of the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt and the Federal Supreme Court in Iraq, which annulled absolute delegations and safeguarded parliamentary monopoly over taxation.

Consequently, the study recommends a constitutional amendment in Iraq to codify restricted financial delegation, stricter drafting of budget bills to prevent "blank check" (unrestricted) authorizations, and reinforcing the technical role of the Federal Board of Supreme Audit to curb executive overreach during exceptional spending and fund transfers.