The Constitutional Regulations of Independent Commissions in Iraq

Abstract

This study addresses the constitutional organization ofindependentbodies in Iraq according to the 2005 Constitution, byclarifyingtheirconcept, divisions, legal nature, and means of oversightovertheirwork. The study reviewed the jurisprudential definitions ofindependent bodies, ranging from organic, functional, and mixedcriteria, and clarified their financial and administrative independence,and their connection to the House of Representatives or the CouncilofMinisters, or their complete independence. The studyalso discussedthe problematic legal nature of these bodies, whetherthey are considered administrative bodies or a fourth branchof     government, while presenting trends in Iraqi jurisprudence and constitutional jurisprudence. The study also addressed parliamentary oversight, particularly interpellation and dismissal, as the two main means stipulated in the Constitution. The study concluded that the constitutional texts were characterized by ambiguity, necessitating the amendment of some articles to define the nature and functions of independent bodies and ensure effective oversight over them. It also proposed including an explicit definition of these bodies in the Constitution and reconsidering the limits of their connection to the federal authorities.