Constitutional Lawsuits: A Comparative Study

Abstract

The license to challenge is an important application of the constitutional public order that expands oversight of the constitutionality of laws and makes it effective oversight. It allows the judge to deviate from the principle of adhering to the requests of the litigants in the constitutional case based on several justifications in order to consolidate constitutional legitimacy. The research problem revolves around a fundamental principle that governs the work of the judiciary in all its forms, whether it belongs to the ordinary judiciary, the administrative judiciary, or the constitutional judiciary, namely the principle of determining the scope of the lawsuit based on the requests of the litigants. This requires the judge to issue a ruling in accordance with the requests submitted by the litigants, and he may not exceed the limits of those requests. However, the constitutional judge exceeded this principle, which raised several questions, the first of which is whether the constitutional judge's exceeding of the aforementioned principle constitutes a violation of the constitution, the second is whether the idea of ​​intervention is a necessity or a duty, the third is whether it is possible to resort to the idea of ​​intervention without there being a text on which the constitutional judge relies that authorizes him to resort to it, the fourth is whether the effects resulting from the idea of ​​intervention produce the same effects that result from constitutional review, and the fifth is whether the practice of constitutional courts is limited to the practice of the idea of ​​intervention during the exercise of their powers in reviewing the constitutionality of laws, or does it extend to stating the legitimacy of the laws that the constitutional courts apply to the dispute presented to them during the exercise of other powers.