Deterrent sanction for beneficial wrongdoing

Abstract

Punitive or deterrent compensation is considered one of the most important features of the development of civil law within the scope of civil liability and penalties for negligence in cases where other methods of compensation fail to address the issue. Although compensation is no longer limited to actual damages but has expanded to include broader forms that respond to the nature and complexities of modern risks, it has remained incapable of addressing profitable negligence. This is despite the fact that the idea of ​​punitive compensation is not a new one, but rather its roots extend back to the early stages of the formation of law before it reached its current form. We have addressed "punitive compensation" as a deterrent penalty to address "profitable negligence" because, in our view, other penalties are inadequate in achieving sufficient deterrence. Full compensation is economically neutral, and restitution removes profit but does not cause loss, while civil fines are a project that has not yet been implemented. This has led us to ultimately consider "punitive compensation" the most effective penalty for addressing "profitable negligence" because it possesses the ability to transcend the limits of traditional compensation, remove the benefit, and achieve a significant impact. A deterrent measure that aligns with the opportunistic nature of "profitable error" will be clarified in this study. Deterrent compensation or penalties raise several important questions concerning its definition and the legal systems that have implemented it. Researching deterrent compensation for profitable error within the framework of civil liability requires us to combine more than one scientific research methodology. Therefore, we will adopt an analytical approach by analyzing legal texts that address profitable error in order to understand the problems this topic raises. The research also necessitates employing a comparative approach.