Constitutional oversight of laws between Iraq and Iran

Abstract

Comparing Iraq and Iran in this regard opens up a broad analytical horizon, as both countries embrace radically different models of state form, governance style, and the foundations for building constitutional legitimacy. After 2003, Iraq transitioned from an authoritarian presidential system to a federal parliamentary system whose legitimacy is built on political pluralism and recognition of ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. The Iraqi constitution attempted to consolidate the concept of the rule of law by establishing the Federal Supreme Court as an independent body tasked with overseeing the constitutionality of laws and interpreting constitutional texts. However, this court has remained a subject of ongoing controversy due to the ambiguity of the wording of its constitutional provisions, the delay in issuing its law, and the political squabbling surrounding its formation. This has led many researchers to question its actual independence and its ability to impose genuine constitutional oversight. Constitutional oversight is no longer merely a legal mechanism to protect the constitutional document from tampering or deviation from its provisions; it has become the essence of the democratic process and one of the most prominent indicators of the existence of a state of law and institutions. The constitution of any country represents the highest social contract. Furthermore, the nature of membership in both the Federal Supreme Court and the Guardian Council highlights the structural differences between the two systems. While Iraqi court judges are supposed to have judicial and legal experience, half of the members of the Guardian Council in Iran are religious jurists who often lack modern legal training. This is reflected in the quality of the council's rulings and positions on legislative issues.