Situational Prevention of Economic Crimes in Iranian and Iraqi Law
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66026/66db1r39Keywords:
Situational prevention; Economic crimes; Criminal policy; Anti-corruption; Iranian and Iraqi criminal law.Abstract
Abstract
Economic crimes represent one of the most complex and harmful forms of contemporary criminality, given their profound impact on the national economic structure, the stability of administrative systems, and the legitimacy of public authority. Comparative legislative experience demonstrates that traditional punitive approaches are no longer sufficient to curb these highly sophisticated offenses, especially within environments where political and economic interests overlap and decision-making centers are fragmented, as is the case in Iran and Iraq. Consequently, situational prevention has emerged as a preventive criminal-law approach that transcends the punitive framework, focusing instead on modifying the structural and procedural conditions that create opportunities for offending. This approach seeks to increase the cost of criminal behavior and reduce institutional and administrative vulnerabilities that may be exploited to harm public funds or manipulate governmental processes.
This descriptive, analytical, and comparative study examines the conceptual framework of situational prevention, its theoretical underpinnings within modern criminology (opportunity theory, social disintegration theory, crime market theory) and criminal policy, and its legislative manifestations within Iranian and Iraqi legal systems. The research draws upon a detailed analysis of key statutory texts, including Iran’s Law on Promoting Administrative Integrity and Combating Corruption, the Iraqi Integrity Commission Law No. 30 of 2011, anti-money-laundering legislation in both countries, as well as obligations arising under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003). The findings indicate that Iran has adopted a multi-level preventive system—such as pre-contractual oversight of government procurement, financial disclosure mechanisms, internal audit units, and monitoring of banking transactions—yet still suffers from a lack of institutional integration and overlapping competencies among oversight bodies. Iraq, despite having developed an extensive post-2003 legislative framework encompassing financial disclosure, preventive investigation, financial auditing, and anti-money-laundering measures, continues to face challenges stemming from weak digital infrastructure, fragmented institutional responsibilities, and limited inter-agency coordination.
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