Mechanisms for Combating Non-Punitive Administrative Crime in Iraq and Egypt
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66026/wsadd785Keywords:
Administrative Crime, Non-Punitive Mechanisms, Administrative Oversight, Transparency, Integrity, Financial Disclosure, Iraq, Egypt.Abstract
This research aims to review and analyze non-punitive mechanisms for combating administrative crime in both Iraq and Egypt, focusing on a comprehensive approach that integrates preventive measures and non-penal interventions, rather than relying solely on traditional punishment. Both countries adopt an integrated system designed for administrative prevention, deterrence, and the protection of public interest. These preventive mechanisms are centered around three core pillars. Firstly, administrative and financial oversight, both ex-ante and ex-post, serves as the primary line of defense for prevention. This is carried out through independent regulatory bodies: in Iraq, the Commission of Integrity and the Federal Board of Supreme Audit play this role, while in Egypt, the Administrative Control Authority and the Central Auditing Organization fulfill this function. Secondly, enhancing transparency and integrity in public administration involves implementing financial disclosure for officials as a preventive measure to uncover illicit enrichment, protecting whistleblowers, and establishing codes of conduct for public service. Thirdly, awareness and education initiatives aim to raise societal and professional consciousness about the risks of corruption.
Despite shared philosophical foundations and identical international commitments in combating corruption, significant differences emerge in practical implementation. Sources indicate that Iraq’s anti-corruption system is negatively affected by its political quota system (Muhasasa) and weak coordination among regulatory bodies, which diminishes its effectiveness. In contrast, Egypt presents a relatively more centralized and stable model, with a strategic orientation towards proactive prevention and broadening the scope of preventive criminalization. It is concluded that the effectiveness of non-punitive mechanisms hinges upon genuine political will, the independence of regulatory institutions, and their capacity to operate free from pressure.


