The Problem of National Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Between the Principle of Non-Intervention and State Responsibility

Abstract

The problem of national sovereignty in cyberspace stems from the erosion of traditional territoriality principles, as the borderless, intangible nature of digital data and activities undermines the foundation of state jurisdiction. This issue gains critical importance with the rise of cross‑border cyberattacks that exploit the legal vacuum created by the mismatch between classic international law rules (attribution, state responsibility, non‑intervention) and the unique features of the digital environment. This article examines the legal basis for extending territorial sovereignty to cyberspace and the obligations of states to protect their sovereignty from cyber threats, focusing on the principle of non‑intervention, the circumstances precluding wrongfulness such as consent (intervention by request of the affected state), and the right of self‑defence as an exception to the prohibition of the use of force. The research adopts a comparative analytical methodology, drawing on primary sources of public international law (UN Charter, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 2001), interpretative international documents (UNGGE reports, Tallinn Manual 2.0), as well as comparative Arab national legislation and regional/international instruments. Key findings include: the absence of a comprehensive binding treaty on cyber sovereignty and due diligence creates a dangerous legal vacuum exploited by technologically advanced states to launch destructive cyberattacks that remain below the “armed attack” threshold triggering self‑defence; traditional attribution criteria (e.g., effective control) are hardly applicable in the context of cyber proxies, making the establishment of international responsibility almost impossible without an independent technical fact‑finding mechanism; and current Arab legislative approaches focus on punitive measures while neglecting proactive oversight of private entities, thereby undermining due diligence. The article recommends a dynamic interpretation of traditional rules, the establishment of an urgent‑procedure cyber chamber within the ICJ, and a binding Arab regional protocol for intervention by request of the affected state, along with objective standards for attribution and evidentiary presumptions.