The Scope of Procedural and Substantive Limitations on Constitutional Amendment and Their Impact on Political System Stability: The Iraqi Constitution as a Case Study

Abstract

This study examines the scope of total and substantive constraints imposed on constitutional amendment and analyzes their impact on the stability of the political system, taking the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 as a case study. The research is based on the premise that the power to amend the constitution, despite its necessity to keep pace with political and social developments, is not absolute. Rather, it is restricted by constitutional safeguards intended to protect fundamental principles and prevent deviation from the core of the constitutional order. These safeguards take the form of total constraints related to amendment procedures, timing, and competent authorities, as well as substantive constraints that entrench certain principles and provisions against amendment.

The study analyzes the jurisprudential and legal foundations of these constraints, their types, and their manifestations in the Iraqi Constitution, particularly through Articles (126) and (142). It highlights how the amendment mechanism is structured in a way that reflects the constitutional framers’ intent to strike a balance between constitutional flexibility and stability. The research also discusses the role of these constraints in safeguarding constitutional constants on the one hand, and the potential risk of creating constitutional rigidity that may hinder political reform on the other.

The study concludes that constitutional constraints, if properly designed and applied, can contribute to enhancing political stability. However, excessive rigidity may undermine the constitution’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances, which calls for reconsideration of certain aspects to achieve a balanced relationship between protection and flexibility.