"Constitutional Challenges of the Distribution of Powers in Iraq: An Analytical Study in Light of American Federal Theory."
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66026/tr9dac19Keywords:
(Federalism; Distribution of Constitutional Powers; Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005); American Federal Theory; Federal Supreme Court; Kurdistan Region).Abstract
This study examines the constitutional challenges of the distribution of powers in Iraq through an analytical approach grounded in American federal theory as the principal framework of comparative federalism. The study is based on the premise that the challenges facing the Iraqi federal system do not stem solely from ambiguities in the constitutional text, but rather from the absence of a coherent constitutional philosophy governing the allocation, interpretation, and implementation of constitutional powers.
The research adopts both analytical and comparative methodologies by examining the provisions of the 2005 Constitution of the Republic of Iraq relating to exclusive, concurrent, and residual powers, and comparing them with the principles established in American federal theory. It also analyzes the role of the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court in interpreting the constitutional rules governing the distribution of powers and in shaping the constitutional relationship between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region.
The study concludes that the core constitutional challenge in Iraq lies neither in the adoption of federalism as a form of state nor in the constitutional classification of powers, but rather in the lack of structural coherence within the constitutional framework governing the relationship between different levels of government, as well as the absence of clear interpretive principles and effective constitutional institutions capable of managing overlapping jurisdictions. It further demonstrates that the persistence of constitutional disputes should not be regarded as evidence of the failure of federalism itself, but rather because of the incomplete institutional and legislative foundations of the Iraqi federal system.
The study argues that reforming Iraq's federal system does not necessarily require constitutional amendment. Instead, it calls for reconstructing the constitutional philosophy underlying the interpretation of the Constitution, completing the legislative and institutional framework envisioned by the Constitution, and fostering a culture of constitutional cooperation among the different levels of government. Finally, the study emphasizes the importance of drawing upon the principles of American federal jurisprudence to develop a coherent Iraqi constitutional theory of the distribution of powers that enhances constitutional stability while maintaining an appropriate balance between the unity of the state and the autonomy of its constituent regions.
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