The Roots of Bribery in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon

Abstract

This research delves into the deep structural roots of bribery in the political, administrative, and economic systems of Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. It asserts that corruption is not merely an individual deviation but rather a symptom of profound structural failure within rentier governance systems that perpetuate corruption. The political roots vary among the three models: While Iraq and Lebanon entrench corruption through a sectarian/consociational power-sharing model that transforms the state into a vehicle for elite exploitation and self-enrichment, Iran suffers from vertical dominance and institutional authoritarianism. In Iran, the pervasive influence of special interests and the overlap of authorities impede comprehensive accountability. This situation is exacerbated by the lack of institutionalized party systems, which facilitates the rise of overwhelming kinship ties and a culture of cronyism at the expense of meritocracy.

Economically, these countries share the dominance of a rentier economy, which renders the state politically independent from its citizens. The catastrophic decline in wages, particularly in Lebanon, makes bribery a survival necessity or a compensatory mechanism for employees. Administratively and legally, bribery is rooted in bureaucratic complexities and a lack of transparency, turning it into an obligatory transit cost to overcome lethal routine. The Iranian challenge lies in its primary reliance on moral and religious deterrents as a cornerstone for oversight, contrasting with a deficiency in coordination among its multiple regulatory bodies. Despite the severity of Iranian legislation, which punishes major bribery cases by publishing final rulings, it remains inadequate in providing preventative deterrence against small and medium-scale corruption.